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Summary 
The recording industry has seen a massive decline in sales since 1999. This decline 
has by many, especially the recording industry itself, been attributed to the introduction of 
file-sharing services on the Internet. But despite lawsuits and campaigns advertising moral 
behavior, sales continue to decline. Moreover, individuals seem to treat music as a „public 
good‟ more than a „private good‟. 
This thesis investigates the claim put forth by the recording industry that internet file-
sharing is to blame for the decline in record sales. It provides an overview of relevant 
literature on the subject, and uses this to analyze if piracy can have other effects on the 
industry and the economy than just displacing sales. It finds that, under certain assumptions, 
piracy might act as a promotional tool, potentially increasing the sale of a subsequent album, 
or increasing demand for complimentary goods, like live performances. The thesis also looks 
at how the current copyright and copy protection schemes have been designed, and discusses 
whether there is room for changes that might improve social welfare. It concludes that 
targeted enforcement is a better option than current broad-based enforcement, if possible. It 
also concludes that of the three government options tax, subsidy, and fine, a subsidy is the 
socially preferred alternative. Enforcing a tax on copy complementaries, like CD-burners, 
recordable CDs or a multimedia tax, is a second-best option, whereas a fine only lowers the 
consumer surplus without positively benefiting the publisher. 
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1 Introduction 
Few industries have experienced more rapid change the past decade than the 
entertainment industry. The widespread penetration of broadband internet access has made 
downloading of music, movies and books an easy and quick activity. Musical recordings are 
now leaked to the Internet before they are even released officially from the record company, 
and a movie can be downloaded to a laptop in Norway as it premieres in Hollywood. At the 
same time, the entertainment industry reports declining sales and bleak prospects for the 
future. 
 Considering its part in the economy, the focus given to the crisis in the entertainment 
industry is highly disproportionate. It is estimated that the entertainment industry only 
contributed between 5 and 7 percent of the American gross domestic product (GDP), and the 
music industry made up only 0.11 percent of the world GDP in 2000 (Liebowitz, 2006; 
Romer, 2002). However, the consumption of these goods tell us something about their 
importance: a U.S. Census Bureau report from 2003 showed that the average American spent 
4.5 hours a day watching television, and more than 3 hours listening to music (Liebowitz, 
2006).  
 Illegal downloading, file-sharing, or piracy as it is commonly known, has exploded 
during this past decade. As technology has improved, it has become easier and cheaper to find 
and download illegal copies from the Internet than ever before. Downloading a pop album 
could take more than 15 minutes in the late 90s (not including the time it took to find working 
links). Today, it is done in a matter of seconds (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2009; Zentner, 
2006). The introduction of portable music players like the iPod has also increased the demand 
for digital music files.  
 The recording industry argues that illegal downloading displaces record sales. And 
surely, record sales have declined drastically around the world this past decade. This thesis 
examines the claim put forth by the recording industry and copyright advocates that file-
sharing and illegal downloading is to blame for the decline in record sales. By use of existing 
literature on the topics of file-sharing, piracy, the music industry and copyrights, it also 
examines the potential consequences that file-sharing might have on an economy, and how it 
might affect the music industry as we know it today. I show that the losses reported by the 
recording industry are most likely overblown. Furthermore, I find that under certain criteria, 
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piracy might actually work in a positive way, as it increases the number of individuals 
listening to an artist. This increases demand for complementarities to records, and I show that 
there therefore might arise a conflict of interest between the artist and the record company 
publishing her album. 
 The thesis focuses mainly on U.S. numbers and U.S. industries. This follows as a 
consequence of the geographical location of the entertainment industry of the Western world. 
Where applicable, however, global numbers and effects are analyzed.  
 This rest of this thesis is organized as follows: section 2 gives us the background of the 
economics of copying, and explains what is meant by file-sharing, piracy, and copyrights; 
section 3 examines the claims made by the recording industry of how much piracy costs 
society annually; section 4 introduces the concept that piracy might increase demand for 
subsequent releases from an artist, while section 5 shows that it might increase demand for 
complementary goods like live performances; section 6 then shows that the artist might not 
oppose piracy in the same way as the publisher will; section 7 investigates how piracy affects 
innovation within the music and recording industries, and section 8 provides some policy 
implications regarding copyrights; section 9 concludes. 
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2 Background 
The economics of copying can be traced back at least as far as Plant‟s seminal 1934 
study „The Economics Aspect of Copyrights in Books‟. There, he acknowledges the need for 
a copyright on intellectual goods like books to make sure authors are remunerated for their 
effort but he is also aware that monetary reward is not the only reason why authors write 
books. He also claims that the copyright makes sure that more authors will write, and that 
there will be a greater variety in books as a consequence of the copyright. On the other hand, 
there will be fewer copies of the books that people actually want to read. Plant also finds an 
increase in publishers as a consequence of the copyright, something that would give the 
authors more bargaining power when choosing with whom to sign publishing agreements, and 
that the prices of books will be higher than the competitive level. Plant, in other words, is 
aware that the copyright will lead to a monopoly situation in the sale of books. 
 Plant argues that the copyright monopoly is not the most efficient way to remunerate 
authors, and makes the case that government subsidies financed by taxation might be a better 
option, if feasible. If this is not feasible, Plant argues that copyright monopolies should be 
restricted by an agency in the same way that patents and licenses are distributed. He does, 
however, comment on the practical difficulties of granting some books and authors a 
copyright while leaving others without. 
 The economics of copying has, in the aftermath of Plant, been a popular subject since 
technology has lead to new innovation that threatens existing business models. In the 70s and 
80s, the introduction of photocopiers led economists to study its effect on journal sales. Then 
the focus turned to the effect of VHS players on the movie theaters, and then on movie rentals 
when the VHS players were turned into recorders as well. In the late 90s and the 2000s, the 
focus has shifted to the consequences of internet and file-sharing on the media industry.  
 File-sharing has been subject to media attention since the late 90s, especially in the 
case of the file-sharing network Napster, which led to an explosion of opinions and press 
coverage. Economists, business analysts, lawyers, and sociologists have all undertaken studies 
on the topic, in order to explain how and why file-sharing happens, who the file-sharers are, 
what the consequences on the media industry will be, and how the legal system is to react to 
this new digital threat.  
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 The copyright of an intellectual good makes for a legal dilemma. Publishers and 
producers have, since the development of the photocopier argued that the copyright is 
infringed in every occasion where copying occurs and, on occasion, the courts were in 
agreement (Gordon, 1982). Proponents of copying have claimed that the so-called „fair-use‟ 
doctrine allows them to make copies of journals, movies, TV-shows, or musical records for 
their own benefit. „Fair-use‟ is a doctrine that allows for copyrighted work, or parts thereof, to 
be copied without remuneration or the copyright holder‟s consent, if it is in the general social 
interest. This is by no means an easy task to decide, and the „fair-use‟ doctrine was, in the 
case of Universal City Studios v Sony Corp. of America in 1981, called “the most 
troublesome in the whole law of copyright” (Gordon, 1982, p. 1600). In the cases regarding 
photocopiers, Betamax-players, VHS-players, and cassette-recorders, the legal precedent 
eventually became that copying was considered „fair-use‟, and the affected industries found 
new business methods to compensate for losses incurred by copying (Liebowitz, 2006). The 
results regarding online file-sharing have been markedly different. 
 The file-sharing network Napster was launched in 1999 and turned out to be an 
immediate success. In November 1999, there were 1 million registered users, and by July 
2000 this had grown to be 20 million (Hong, 2005). As much as 2.8 billion music tracks were 
estimated to be downloaded in February 2001 alone (Romer, 2002). The music industry, led 
by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), acted swiftly and took Napster 
and its creators to court. Napster was closed in July 2001 as a consequence of these legal 
actions, but the damage done was irreversible. Its millions of users switched to other file-
sharing software to get a hold of the latest songs rather than buying them at the record store. 
Napster had opened a brand new market, and software like LimeWire and Gnutella followed 
in its immediate footsteps. LimeWire, which was founded in 2000, was finally shut down by 
American legal authorities in October 2010 after the RIAA had sued the company behind the 
LimeWire software, Lime Wire LLC, for enriching themselves through copyright 
infringement.
1
 In Sweden, the file-sharing site PirateBay is the subject of numerous legal 
claims. Having operated since 2004, the site is claimed to be the 94
th
 most popular web page 
worldwide.
2
 Its founders were found guilty of “assistance to copyright infringement” in 2009 
and sentenced to 1 year in prison, as well as fined approximately $3.6 million.
3
  
                                               
1
 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2616212420101026?pageNumber=1, accessed Nov 1st 2010 
2
 http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/thepiratebay.org, accessed Nov 1
st
 2010 
3 http://www.economist.com/node/13518830, accessed Nov 1st 2010 
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 Piracy and file-sharing has, over the past decade, become household terms, and to the 
worry of the entertainment industry, it has also become a norm. Teenagers and adults alike 
seem to experience little or no moral qualms in downloading a copyrighted file, even if they 
are aware that it is illegal. Consumers feel that music and movies should be sold at their 
marginal cost, and also that the artists and record companies make enough money as it is 
(Chiou et. al, 2005). Not witnessing the effect of their activities displaces their feeling of guilt 
or injustice, and consumers are, to an increasing extent, becoming accustomed to attaining 
their media goods free of charge (ibid.). The rise of the political Pirate Party across the world 
underlines this tendency. Founded in Sweden in 2006, they are now represented in over 40 
different countries worldwide. Based on a platform that today‟s copyright system is flawed 
and unable to handle the free flow of information made possible by the internet, the Swedish 
Pirate Party has been elected into parliament in Sweden, while three other nations have Pirate 
Party members elected into district- and local governments. This rise in the „Napster 
mentality‟ might be more alarming to the media industry than file-sharing itself (Bach, 2004). 
 Before moving on to the economic effects piracy and file-sharing might have on the 
music industry and the economy as a whole, it might be useful to define what piracy and file-
sharing actually is. 
2.1 What is Piracy? 
 The term „piracy‟ is used a bit carelessly in both media and in academic studies, and 
will be used carelessly in this paper as well. The more precise definition of piracy, according 
to the digital goods industry, is the act of copying or counterfeiting in order to derive a profit 
on resale (Rayna, 2004). Classic examples would be copies of a CD or DVD sold on the black 
market or at flea markets. These items are physical copies, and they represent physical sales. 
An IFPI estimate says that 1.2 million pirate CDs were sold in 2005 (Siwek, 2007).  
The more relevant aspect for this paper is often referred to as „softlifting‟ by the 
industry (Rayna, 2004). This is defined as the copying of software, music, or movies without 
authorization from the publisher, but for personal use and not with the purpose of selling it to 
others in order to derive a profit. Thus, what is usually referred to as „piracy‟ in the media is 
actually „softlifting‟, but the possibilities brought forth by the Internet have blurred these 
lines. In this present paper, I shall therefore use the term „piracy‟ to cover both „softlifting‟ 
and the industry‟s definition of „piracy‟.  
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2.2 What is File-Sharing? 
 File-sharing is a technology for easy and quick distribution of digital media on the 
Internet. Popularized by peer-to-peer (P2P) software like Napster at the dawn of the 
millennium, file-sharing is now looked upon as the biggest threat to the entertainment 
industry. In essence, a P2P-software connects two or more computers and allows a user to 
copy files which the other user („host‟) has made available. The file-sharing software allows 
the user to search for a specific file and produces a list of all other users who are hosting that 
specific file and offers it for „sharing‟. The user who makes the file available neither 
experiences a reduction in the quality of her internet-connection, nor on her enjoyment of the 
file being shared. More than one user can copy the same file from the same host at the same 
time, even while the host is using the file at her own computer. Therefore, the file no longer 
possesses the rival quality that it did while on the CD, and it moves closer to being a public 
good. As these files are offered free in monetary terms, and the penetration of high-speed 
broadband internet connection is steadily increasing, at least in the Western world, the 
exclusiveness of a media file is also becoming a thing of the past. New file-sharing software, 
like BitTorrents, even allows the user to copy small parts of the media files from a variety of 
hosts at the same time, thus substantially lowering the time spent on downloading a file. 
 Publishers of file-sharing software have been taken to court by special interest groups 
like the RIAA on numerous occasions. Howver, apart from Napster, and more recently 
PirateBay and LimeWire, it has proved difficult to get legal consensus to shut down the 
services. This is because the above-mentioned Betamax-case states that a company is “not 
liable for customers‟ acts of copyright infringement if their technology is capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses” (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2009, p. 8). Most software 
producers, however, have chosen to settle legal disputes from the entertainment industry out 
of court, after a court decision in 2005 ruled that “their goal was to induce copyright 
infringement” (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2009, p. 9). LimeWire proved the only notable 
exception but, as of October 2010, they have also been shut down on order by a U.S. federal 
court.
4
 
 
                                               
4 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2616212420101026?pageNumber=1, accessed Nov 1st 2010. 
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2.3 What is Copyright? 
 As intellectual goods like music, movies, and books have a near zero marginal cost of 
producing when first produced, copyrights have been installed to ensure remuneration to the 
producers of the good. This is based on the concept that in order to stimulate further 
production of these goods, there is a need for a financial incentive. Though the origin of the 
copyright can be traced all the way back to England during the 1600s, music was not included 
until the U.S. Copyright Act was revised in 1909 (Varian, 2005). 
 An intellectual property protection has three dimensions: length, width, and height. 
„Height‟ is perhaps the most loosely defined of these terms. It is an indication of how „new‟ 
an idea put forth must be in order to be protected. In this respect, copyrights can usually be 
considered to be quite low, and almost everything created is protected by a copyright as soon 
as it exists in a tangible form (ibid.). This means that it is the expression of an idea that is 
covered by the copyright, not the idea itself. By „width‟ one means the extent to which an 
expression is covered by the protection. A copyright offers quite narrow protection in that 
only the expression is covered. For music, this means that it is legal to copy methods, ideas, 
concepts and inspirations, as long as the expression differs. Lastly, „length‟ is a reference to 
how long the protection will be in place. The copyright‟s purpose is to give protection of the 
good for a limited time, for the holder to reap the economic profit arising from it. At the 
moment, this limited time is internationally set at default as “the life of the author plus 
seventy years” (Varian, 2005, p. 127).  
 As the terminology and concepts now should be clear, I shall move on to discussing 
the effects piracy can have on the economy in general, and the recording industry in specific. 
This is the topic of the next section.  
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3 The Cost of Piracy 
Illegal copying, or piracy, has several potential effects on an industry and on an 
economy. The most obvious effect would be that it displaces sales of the legal product. If an 
illegal copy is close enough to the original in quality, the two become close substitutes. If this 
is the case, then consumers would choose the cheaper of the two goods. Disregarding moral 
costs, this would most likely be the illegal copy. Faced with a competitor that has near-zero 
marginal cost, the publisher of the legal good is at a disadvantage as it bears the fixed cost 
attached with producing digital media goods. And if producers are unable to cover their 
losses, they will eventually go out of business 
This has also been part of the basis of the recording industry‟s campaign against 
piracy. With slogans such as „Piracy is killing music‟, industry associations and lobbyists 
have, at times viciously, argued that unless governments and enforcement agencies step up 
their fight against copyright violations, the entire digital media industry faces almost certain 
death. In the US, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) launched lawsuits, 
firstly against those responsible for file-sharing networks and sites, and then later against 
individuals caught sharing copyrighted material.
5
 There is no denying the obvious: record 
sales have gone down drastically during the past 10 years, and the decrease coincides 
suspiciously with the introduction of file-sharing networks like Napster.
6
 This „perfect fit‟ 
surely calls for an investigation as to whether there really is a cause-effect connection, or if it 
is all just a coincidence. After all, the turn of the decade saw an economic downturn, 
especially in the U.S., highlighted by the bursting of the so-called „dot-com bubble‟. Another 
reason could be that music consumers switched to consuming other goods that can be viewed 
as substitutes. Evidence does point to an increase in spending on movies and computer games 
at the same time as record sales declined (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007). But if there is 
a negative correlation between file-sharing and legal sales, what is the full economic 
consequence of this? 
The recording industry is the industry that has been hit the hardest by file-sharing so 
far. RIAA numbers reveal that per capita sales of recorded albums have gone down from 
approximately 5.5 in 1999 to a predicted 2.5 in 2005 (Liebowitz, 2006). With the exception of 
                                               
5
 http://www.riaa.com/faq.php, accessed Oct. 20
th
 2010. 
6
 See, for example, Liebowitz (2006), Ehmer and Porsch (2008), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2009), or BPI 
Research & Information (2009). 
9 
 
2004, there has been a marked and steady decline in sales every year since Napster started the 
file-sharing revolution mid 1999. Some have argued that the percentage increase in record 
sales in 2004 proves that file-sharing‟s impact on record sales has been grossly exaggerated 
by the recording industry,
7
 while others believe that this temporary rise was a result of 
RIAA‟s legal action against individuals who were caught file-sharing (Liebowitz, 2006). The 
latest available statistics from the RIAA indicate that sales of physical albums on CD have 
decreased by 20.5 per cent in units between 2008 and 2009, while sales of albums on cassettes 
have gone down by 102.8 per cent. Even though the sales of CD-singles and albums on vinyl 
have increased, their market share is too small to make much of an impact: Total retail 
decreased by 18.2 per cent in units between 2008 and 2009. In dollar terms, this change 
means 20 per cent less retail value in one year, or approximately $1.1 billion.
8
  
The above discussion is by no means the full economic picture but merely points out 
that the obvious direct effect of the decline in record sales is of significant proportions, and 
this is for the United States alone. The other major music markets also suffered a decline in 
physical sales. Germany saw a decline of 4 per cent in physical units in 2007 (Ehmer and 
Porsch, 2008), while the United Kingdom had a decline of 8 per cent in 2009.
9
 These are, of 
course, quite serious setbacks to any industry. Sadly, it is not the only consequence displaced 
record sales will have on an economy. 
When consumers are choosing to illegally download recorded music, they deprive 
record companies and artists of their income. It also deprives record stores of their sales, as 
they are the link between the publisher and the consumer. Indirectly, it will also hurt 
producers of supplies to the record companies and stores, as well as the industries selling 
complementary goods to recorded music, like CD-players or plastic casings (jewel boxes) for 
CDs. There will therefore be a multiplier effect arising from displaced record sales that has 
consequences far beyond just the publisher‟s profit or artist‟s income. This loss of revenue 
will in all industries potentially lead to fewer jobs available. Lastly, there will be a loss of 
government revenue due to less tax being paid. This decrease arises from both the loss of 
income tax, as fewer people are employed in the affected sectors, and from the loss of sales 
                                               
7 http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2004/jul/22/netmusic.digitalmedia, accessed Oct 20th 2010. 
8 Numbers taken from RIAA (http://76.74.24.142/A200B8A7-6BBF-EF15-3038-582014919F78.pdf), accessed 
Oct 20th, 2010. 
9
 Authors calculation using numbers from the British Recorded Music Industry (BPI) 
(http://www.bpi.co.uk/assets/files/UK%20Market%20-%20Top%20Lines%20%282000-2009%29.pdf), accessed 
Oct 20th, 2010, 
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tax, as consumers switch to the free-of-charge illegal good instead of the legal product. As 
these losses add up, the consequences to the economy increase as well. 
Few studies exist that try to fully measure these effects. Most existing studies have 
measured the impact of file-sharing on record sales. An article by Oberholzer-Gee and 
Strumpf (2007)
10
 created quite a bit of controversy when released as it claimed that the 
overall effect of file-sharing on record sales was minimal, if there even was one. Their article 
has later been subject to a lot of scrutiny, and especially Liebowitz (2007) was almost vitriolic 
in his criticism of Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf‟s result. In general, most economists do 
disagree with Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf: Michel (2006) finds that file-sharing has lead to a 
decline in the sale of recorded music, while Hong (2004) estimates that approximately 20 per 
cent of the sales decline while Napster was in operation can be attributed to file-sharing. 
Others who have found similar results include Zentner (2006) and Rob and Waldfogel (2006). 
The evidence of piracy‟s effect on record sales thus seems overwhelming. Accepting 
the hypothesis that record sales indeed have suffered because of illegal file-sharing and 
physical piracy, we turn to the question of how much harm illegal copying has caused the 
economy. The studies mentioned above estimate that sales displacement has been somewhere 
between 10 and 30 per cent, so it seems natural to follow Siwek (2007) who assumes that of 
every five songs illegally downloaded, one of them would have been purchased legally absent 
of piracy. Siwek is also, to my knowledge, the only study that aims to quantify the total 
impact of piracy on the economy. He also includes physical piracy, meaning the selling of 
bootleg-copies at flea-markets etc, to his analysis. When it comes to physical piracy it is 
assumed that displacement of sales is much higher, and based on survey respondents a 
substitution rate of 65.7 per cent is used in this study (BPI Market Information, 2006). 
Using these displacement numbers combined with the cost of acquiring the music 
legally, we can make estimates of the loss incurred in monetary terms. We shall assume a 
retail price of $14.13 per album, as this is the world average retail price, and use the average 
trade price of $8.58 (Siwek, 2007). The loss suffered by the recording industry in the US 
alone from piracy is estimated to be $5.333 billion a year. This consists of a $1.630 billion 
loss from physical piracy and $3.703 billion from file-sharing. Next, the retail industry suffers 
loss of sales worth $1.041 billion as a result of music consumers opting for the pirated 
versions of their favorite albums instead of purchasing it at the record store. The direct effect 
                                               
10 This article was first released  as a working paper in 2004. 
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of piracy in the music market thus leads to a yearly direct loss of $6.374 billion to the US 
recording industry. The numbers are given in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Direct Effect Losses Incurred by Music Piracy 
  Billions of U.S. dollars 
Recording industry  $5.333 
Retail Sector  $1.041 
Total  $6.374 
 
 
Next, the indirect effect needs to be calculated. These are the numbers that are usually 
unaccounted for in most economic studies available. They are also the numbers that are the 
most difficult to estimate and to which there is the most uncertainty attached. One method to 
estimate the indirect effects is to use an input-output model like the RIMS II model. The 
RIMS II model provides multipliers for several U.S. industries, including the sound recording 
industry. The multipliers include „final demand‟ multipliers for output, earnings, and 
employment, and also „direct-effect‟ multipliers for earnings and employment. By using these 
multipliers one can get estimates on how the piracy affects these areas in all other industries. 
A drawback is that the RIMS II is only applicable at local level, and our estimates are for a 
national level. However, since approximately three fourths of sound recording in the U.S. is 
divided between five states,
11
 one can use the RIMS II model independently on each of these 
states to get estimates of how piracy has affected output, earnings, and employment in the 
other industries in those particular states. A similar approach can be used to estimate the 
spillover effect of lost retail sales to other industries.
12
 
By use of the RIMS II model, one can find the counterfactual increase in the economy 
absent of piracy. For the recording industry the counterfactual „final demand‟ would have 
increased output by $10,211 million, earnings by $1,997 millions, and employment by 46,114 
jobs. The numbers from the retail sector are $2,290 million, $699 millions, and 24,946, 
respectively. Adding them up would then give the overall effect on output, employment, and 
earnings accruing from piracy.  
                                               
11
 The states in question are California, New York, Tennessee, Florida, and Texas. 
12
 For the retail sector, eight states have been used as reference points. They are California, New York, Texas, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Florida, and New Jersey. 
Source: Siwek (2007), tables 1 and 3 
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In addition, the RIMS II model gives the estimates for direct employment and direct 
earnings, meaning jobs and respective earnings lost. For the sound recording industries these 
numbers would be 12,019 and $712, respectively. For the retail sector they are 14,841 and 
$342. These estimates are summarized in table 2 below. 
Table 2: Estimates from the RIMS II model 
 Final 
Demand 
(millions) 
Output 
(millions) 
Earnings 
(millions) 
Employment 
Direct 
Employment 
Direct 
Earnings 
(millions) 
Recording 
industry 
$5,333 $10,211 $1,997 46,114 12,019 $712 
Retail $1,040 $2,290 $699 24,946 14,841 $342 
Total  $12,501 $2,696 71,060 26,860 $1,055 
  
Lastly, one can calculate the loss from taxes. This will depend heavily on the findings 
from the RIMS II model. There will be a loss of personal income tax from the direct earnings 
in the recording industry and retail sector of $114 millions, and a total tax revenue loss of 
$291 million when including all input industries.
13
 For the recording industry, lost corporate 
income tax amounts to $81 million and lost production tax of $50 million.
 14
  
Based on these findings we conclude that the overall effect on the U.S. economy 
caused by piracy of recorded music is a loss of $12.5 billion in economic output each year. In 
addition, 71,060 jobs are lost, and the government loses $422 million in tax revenue each 
year. If these numbers are correct, there is no wonder that the recording industry wants the 
government to support their fight against piracy. 
An important caveat is that the estimate is based on how global piracy affects the U.S. 
economy. This might be a natural simplification since the United States is the leading 
provider of copyrighted entertainment goods subject to piracy, but it is still worth keeping in 
mind when these numbers are presented. Also, the use of the RIMS II model is dubious at 
best. The states representing the sound recording industries only make up 75 per cent of the 
American industry but the entire sales decline are attributed to these five states. This will 
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 Using an average tax rate of 10.8 per cent. 
14 Assumed corporate income tax rate 14.8 per cent, and production tax 4.8 per cent. 
Source: Siwek (2007), tables 6 and 7.  
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potentially make the result overblown. This is because the five states are divided according to 
their market share among themselves, but not according to the U.S. market. For example, 
California, the most important recording industry state in the U.S. makes up 41.46 per cent of 
the collective five states. The analysis above then treats California as if they have 41.46 per 
cent of the entire U.S. market, not 41.46 per cent of the 74.3 per cent of it that the five states 
collectively make. Thus, California is given a share of 0.4146 instead of 0.3080, which would 
have been a more accurate share.
15
 This could significantly increase the effect on the 
recording-intensive states, and treat them as relevant for the entire country. The error is more 
significant in the retail sector where the sample of eight states only account for half of the 
American market but still receive the entire loss of sales effect attributed to them. It is 
therefore reasonable to believe that although the numbers might have the correct sign, their 
size might be overrated.  
The analysis by Siwek has often been cited by the recording industry as justification 
for their actions against piracy. It has, a bit surprisingly, not been subject to criticism by other 
economists, nor has it been a much cited analysis. This is problematic since it is the main 
survey portrayed when organizations like RIAA put their opinions across. The criticism that 
does exist of Siwek‟s study usually revolves around him assuming each song downloaded is a 
displaced sale.
16
 As we will see later this criticism might be justified. Another point of interest 
is that all though Siwek claims that he finds the true cost of piracy, he completely disregards 
any potential positive effects. Several other surveys have found that piracy can actually have 
positive effects on the music industry or on society, through promoting an artist to an 
audience that previously would not bother to bear the cost of introducing themselves to the 
music; by selling complementary goods like concert tickets, t-shirts, etc.; or by increasing the 
share of the population able to enjoy the music produced. We will explore all of these topics 
in the following sections. 
                                               
15
 Author’s calculations. 
16 See Hui and Png (2003) 
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4 Promotional Piracy 
The set-up provided by Siwek and the recording industry holds some questionable 
assumptions. As mention, it treats every downloaded file as a lost sale. Other early 
contributions to the economics of copying also do this for every copy.
17
 In addition, these 
studies treat all agents as if they are fully informed, and assume that all valuations of the 
product are independent of the other consumers. These are strong assumptions, and as we 
shall see, they might not be justified.  
 A strand of literature has been written emphasizing the role of network sizes.
18
 The 
general claim is that a larger user base will increase an individual‟s valuation of that particular 
good. Typical examples would be computer software, where one text document software is 
not compatible with a different text document software. Thus, a company like Microsoft may 
hold a competitive advantage just because the size of its network, and potential customers 
might be willing to pay more to buy Microsoft Office programs than those from a competitor. 
Another aspect where the network size might be applicable is the learning process. If most 
firms use one brand of text writing systems then chances are that new employees are familiar 
with these systems when hired. The firm could therefore save themselves costs of training by 
acquiring the same systems themselves. The case for network effects in software should 
therefore be straight forward. When it comes to music, it might seem more dubious to talk 
about network effects. I will nonetheless argue that most individuals find it a heightened 
experience to attend a concert with other people than by themselves, or that discussing an 
album with friends (and, increasingly due to various internet-forums, strangers) increases 
their valuation of the music. Also, the larger the network size, the more likely is it that the 
artist will tour or release new music. 
 The assumption that all individuals are fully informed might be even more 
inappropriate in today‟s music scene than the independent valuation assumption. There are 
thousands upon thousands of different artists releasing recordings in all different sorts of 
musical genres. To be fully informed of all of them is literally impossible even for the most 
zealous music fan. This is probably why record companies spend millions of dollars each year 
on promoting albums and artists. It is fair to say, however, that some artists receive more 
                                               
17
 See, for example, Novos and Waldman (1984) and Johnson (1985) 
18 See, for example, King and Lampe (2002), Silva and Ramello (2000) and Quah (2002). 
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promotional spending from their record company than others. This section will argue that 
rather than just „stealing‟ potential record sales, piracy might under certain circumstances 
potentially act as a promotional tool. More specifically, it introduces a two-period economy 
where the size of the initial market is limited due to incomplete consumer awareness, and 
illegal consumption in the first period might help spread the word about a product and thus 
increase the legal consumption of the product in the second period. In line with Croxson 
(2009), we shall first develop a „no-piracy‟ benchmark case, and find that a monopolist 
publisher will choose to offer a „promotional price‟ in the first period in order to increase the 
consumer awareness the next period by sacrificing some potential profit. We will then 
introduce piracy, and show that a „promotional effect‟ might arise as a consequence of this 
new consumption channel. Note that the model also finds a displacement of sales as a 
potential result from piracy, so the overall result is ambiguous and depends on the 
assumptions and the nature of the pirated good. A generalization will say that software 
intended for offices and research institutions, which would mostly be consumed by adults and 
individuals with higher costs attached to copying, will be more likely to benefit positively 
from piracy, while computer games and music will be more likely to suffer from sales 
displacement.  
4.1 No Piracy Benchmark 
 There are two periods,      , and the monopolist releases a new product in each of 
the two periods. A good example for this paper would be two different albums released by the 
same artist. As throughout this paper, we assume the marginal cost of production (and hence 
also of copying) and distribution to be zero. A consumer consumes either one or zero units of 
the product each period, and she has a valuation   for it. The individuals are distributed in the 
population according to     . Unable to price discriminate, the monopolist charges a uniform 
   to all consumers for the product released in period  . Since awareness of the product is 
limited, only a fraction           of individuals will be in the market considering purchasing 
the product. All others will be blissfully unaware of the product‟s existence, and will thus be 
deriving zero utility from it. We shall assume that initial awareness,   , is exogenously given, 
while awareness in the second period,   , depends positively on total consumption in the first 
period,   , and negatively on the price set by the monopolist in the first period,   , meaning 
   
   
   and 
   
   
  . 
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 The marginal buyer is the consumer who is indifferent between buying the product 
and being without. Her valuation in period   is therefore     . Since only a fraction    
knows about the product, and there is no possibility of piracy, the number of consumers is 
equal to the number of buyers,  
      
              
We shall solve the model backwards. Since there is no third period in this model, the 
publisher does not care about future sales. Knowledge of the product in the second period,   , 
is treated as exogenous as the publisher cannot influence it in this period. The publisher thus 
seeks to maximize the current profit function 
                
Standard models of monopoly sales then say that the optimal price is given by the first-order 
condition, so 
    
       
      
     
By use of this monopoly-price, the maximized second-period profit will be  
   
     
           
Note that this is simply the standard maximization of profit in a monopoly model, but 
multiplied with the awareness-indicator   . Since      is a plausible assumption according 
to the discussion above, this means that limited-awareness leads to lower second-period 
profits in our model than in standard monopoly models. 
 The negative correlation between first period price and second period awareness 
means that the forward-looking publisher will maximize total discounted profit with this in 
mind in the first period. Denote her intertemporal discount factor as        . The publisher 
will then seek to solve the following problem 
                          
  
The first-order condition implies 
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Above we saw that the standard price setting in a monopoly model implied    
       
      
. Our 
optimal price features a second term on the right-hand side. By our assumptions, this extra 
term will be negative since we have assumed a negative correlation between first period price 
and second period awareness, meaning   
    
    . All other components are positive, by 
assumption. 
 Our results then give us the following implications: In the second period, the publisher 
acts as a standard monopolist, and sets price accordingly;   
    . In the first period, 
however, the publisher is aware of the negative effect a high price will have on future 
awareness and consumption, and she therefore opts for a price lower than the monopoly price, 
a so-called „promotional price‟;   
    . The effect of this „promotional price‟ is that it 
allows all individuals with valuation      
      to purchase the product in the first period, 
given that they are aware of its existence. The idea now is that this extra consumption in the 
first period might lead to increased demand in the second period, through „word-of-mouth‟ or 
user experience.  
 Lets define all individuals with valuation of the product high enough to purchase, 
    , as „high types‟. Those who has a valuation lower than the monopoly price,     , 
are by analogy referred to as „low types‟. This means that in the second period, only „high 
types‟ who are aware of the product will consume it. Unaware „high types‟ as well as all „low 
types‟, be they aware or not, will not be consuming the product. In the first period, however, 
the „promotional pricing‟ set by the publisher allows for some of the aware „low types‟ to 
consume the product as well. This is done at a potential cost to first-period profit, however, as 
the publisher has to set this lower price equal for everyone. If there was a way for the 
publisher to allow some of the „low types‟ to consume, and thereby raise second-period 
awareness, without sacrificing her first period profit, then the publisher would find this a more 
optimal option. 
4.2 Pirates, O’Hoi! 
 Above, the consumer only had two options; either she purchased the product at the 
price in period  , or she went on without it. Now, we shall introduce the third option, namely 
the option of copying the product. We assume that there is a cost,      attached to copying. 
This could be the alternative cost of searching the web for the correct files; the cost of 
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purchasing necessary equipment to make copies; the risk of downloading files with viruses; or 
the risk of being caught downloading and prosecuted by authorities. Assuming that she is 
aware, an individual would now choose to purchase the product only if her valuation of it 
exceeds the price, and only if this price is lower than her cost of copying. If this latter 
requirement does not hold, the consumer would rather copy than purchase. If her valuation is 
lower than both the price and her cost of copying, she‟ll choose to not consume the product at 
all. Formally, her utility is 
       
    
   
 
  
 We can illustrate our situation graphically in a     space. A 45-degree line through the 
origin will represent the marginal copier; at any price on this line she would be indifferent 
between copying and being without. By drawing the monopoly price    on both the 
horizontal and vertical axis, we obtain a threshold of valuation, and can divide the space into 
four different categories, depending on the behavior of individuals located there.  
 
 
The areas marked A in the figure above are safe sales. An individual in these areas 
would always have a valuation   higher than the monopoly price   . As their cost of copying 
D 
A 
A 
B 
B 
C 
   
     
  
Figure 1:     space 
Source: Croxson (2009) 
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also exceeds the monopoly price they will never be prone to copy. Individuals in the areas 
marked B will always have a valuation lower than the monopoly price. As their cost of 
copying will always be higher than their valuation of the product as well, an individual in 
these areas will never choose to consume. The individuals in these areas are, in other words, 
of little interest to our analysis.  
The area labeled C is however of greater interest to our analysis. This is where you 
will find „low type‟ individuals who would copy if they had the opportunity. As can be seen 
in the figure, they have a higher valuation of the product than their cost of copying but their 
valuation is not high enough to purchase the product legally at the monopoly price. Given the 
possibility to copy it, they would. Since these individuals would not have been consuming the 
good absent of piracy, the extra consumption cannot represent lost sales. Rather, this would 
be extra promotion to the publisher, as it raises awareness of the product in the second period. 
The area labeled D is its negative counterpoint. These are „high type‟ individuals who 
are more than willing to copy. Since these individuals will maximize their utility by copying 
rather than purchasing, if piracy is an option, these are potentially lost sales to the publisher. 
Therefore, the areas C and D are those who are of interest to the publisher, and also to the 
economist doing the analysis. It should be fairly obvious that whether piracy has a positive or 
a negative effect on the publisher will depend on how individuals are distributed in the     
space.  
Determining the distribution of individuals is by no means a trivial task. We shall 
make the assumption that there, in many markets, may exist a third variable that relates   and 
  monotonically. This would mean that there is a perfect correlation between the marginal 
distribution functions,      and     , for valuation and cost of copying, respectively. A 
natural example of such a variable could, for example, be personal income and age. For 
example, it could be natural to think that business software is more valuable to business 
professionals than to private consumers. As these individuals also tend to have a high 
opportunity cost from copying, this would indicate a positive     relationship. On the other 
hand, computer games are often targeted at young individuals, who are also more likely to 
have less income and thus lower opportunity cost from copying. This would then indicate a 
negative     relationship. The idea is illustrated graphically below. 
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Compare these figures to the     space initially shown in figure 1. It is easy to see that a 
negative     relationship curve will pass through the areas labeled B and D, but not A and C. 
In other words, piracy will in this case be weakly harmful to the publisher, and will never be 
unambiguously beneficial. In the positive     relationship cases, however, the distributions 
will never pass through B and D, but through A and C. Thus, piracy can, in this case, be 
beneficial to the publisher as the consumer base increases without a displacement of sales. 
The question is now: which distribution relationship will be the most applicable to music? 
 To the best of my knowledge, there exists no study that proves or disproves any such 
relationship. There are several studies that claim or imply that low-income groups, like 
teenagers and young adults, are more likely to download music illegally, but this does not 
necessarily mean that these listen more to music than other age- and income groups.
19
 What it 
means is simply that these low-income individuals have a lower cost attached to copying and 
will therefore copy more, something that is in line with our arguments above. Note that the 
characteristics of a normal good imply a positive     relationship in our model since both 
valuation of the good and the cost of copying it increases with income. If we are to adapt to 
the norm, however, it would be natural to assume that the market for music is defined by a 
negative     relationship. This would then imply that piracy of music will have a negative 
effect on a publisher‟s profits, and that the copiers mostly will consist of individuals who 
otherwise would have bought the product. Record companies have been active in enforcing 
copy control mechanisms to avoid piracy of their products. The rationale behind this is 
                                               
19
 Such studies include, but are not limited to, Mortimer and Sorensen (2005), Hong (2005), Oberholzer-Gee 
and Strumpf (2009) and Dapp (2010). Reyna (2004) provides a notable exception. 
Negative     relationship Positive     relationship   
  
  
  
Figure 2: Possible     relationships 
Source: Croxson (2009) 
21 
 
explained within this model. Note also that a change in copy controls will alter the 
distribution curve. This is explored further in our section on policy implications. 
 The model above has outlined a theory where both imperfect awareness and network 
effects have been included. It has shown that there might be cases where piracy actually may 
be beneficial to a publisher. Whether this is the case for music is ambiguous given our 
knowledge on the     relationship of individuals who are in the market for consuming music. 
Unlike business software, music is a good consumed by individuals from all social spectrums 
and backgrounds. It is therefore difficult to say with any assertion that music necessarily has a 
negative     relationship, despite popular assumptions. Another important application would 
be the effect piracy might have on complementary goods like live performances, which is the 
subject of our next section. 
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5 New Demand Gives New Supply 
Whatever the reason, it is an undisputed fact that record sales indeed have gone down 
markedly since the introduction of file-sharing technology and broadband connections to the 
Internet. It is also easily verified that the recording industry blames piracy for this decline. 
From the point of view of an economist, the interesting aspect is not as much who or what is 
to blame, but rather what are the effects and responses to these changes in market structure. 
Above we argued that, given certain criteria, piracy might actually not be a negative thing. 
The main effect is, of course, that the overall number of active listeners could increase, which 
is something that could lead to an increased demand for complementary goods. 
 Mortimer and Sorensen investigate this claim in their 2005 paper “Supply Responses 
to Digital Distribution.” In this paper they collect an impressive data-set of releases of 
recorded music and live performances. Nearly 2,000 musical artists over the course of 10 
years are included in the data set, and both time and location-specific variations are controlled 
for. They show that album sales and the number of new recording artists has declined since 
the dawn of file-sharing but that the number of performing artists as well as concert revenues 
have increased. Overall, this could potentially mean that the artists themselves might be better 
off after the introduction of piracy than in a world without piracy.  
 In line with Mortimer and Sorensen, we present a one-period, two-goods model where 
the two goods in question are the recorded product and the live performance. For simplicity, 
we assume that the artist only gets a share   of the recorded product but the entire profit from 
the live performance. The artist‟s profit function is therefore written as 
                                         
where        and    indicate price, marginal cost, and fixed cost, respectively, and    is the 
demand for product  . The fixed cost of the recorded product includes producing, marketing 
and distributing the album, while the fixed cost of performing live could include the 
opportunity costs attached to the artist devoting her time to rehearsal and performance. In 
addition, the artist puts down effort levels    and    on album production and live 
performance, respectively. These effort levels come at a cost          and can be interpreted 
as the time spent on the two products; how often the artist releases a new album for   ; or 
how often she goes on tour for   . We shall assume an increasing and convex cost of effort 
23 
 
function and that the cross-derivative is positive (
   
      
  ). By including this assumption 
we acknowledge that there is a tradeoff between spending effort on recording and spending 
effort on touring. 
 The consumers valuate the efforts the artists put into their work, and the quality of it. 
Denoting the quality of an artist as  , the valuations,   , for the two goods will be drawn at 
random from a joint distribution            . It is of course dangerous to enter the minefield 
of „quality in music‟, but the assumption made is that higher-quality artists will meet a higher 
demand, meaning that if     , then                               . An important 
implication of these assumptions is that the marginal distributions          are decreasing in 
both    and   . This allows for spillover-effects between the two goods. For example, 
increased effort on live performances,   , might lead to an increase in the demand for 
recorded albums, and vice versa. It will still be assumed, however, that such an increased 
effort on live performances will boost demand for live performances more than it affects the 
demand for recorded albums. 
 We introduce piracy by saying that the consumer can attain good 1 for free at a 
probability of        . Since good 2 is not a tangible good like good 1, piracy only affects 
the purchasing of good 1. The actual share of consumers who purchase good 1 is now 
                 . The key assumption that ties this present model to the one presented 
above in section 4 is that they both assume that only those who have obtained the album, 
legally or illegally, will attend a concert held by an artist. The demand for good 2 is therefore 
contingent on the distribution of good 1. As we saw above, this means that piracy can 
theoretically lead to a promotional effect, only that in this case it promotes complementarities. 
Above, piracy could potentially have a promotional effect on the very same good. But when 
piracy might affect complementarities only, the share of consumers who will now purchase 
good 2, the live performance, is given as 
                                     
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
The first part on the right-hand side is the share of the population who has become aware of 
the artist by buying the recorded product and who also has a valuation for the live 
performance higher than the ticket price. This part is       lower than in the no-piracy case. 
The second part represents those who have obtained a pirated version of the album but have a 
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high enough valuation of the live performance to purchase tickets. This second part is, 
therefore, nothing else than the increased demand for good 2 (live performances) that occurs 
because of the possibility of piracy of good 1 (recorded product). 
 Note that the loss incurred in the first part on the right-hand side is always recovered 
in the second part of the equation. This is because the first integral in the second part runs all 
the way from 0 to infinity, and therefore includes the lost share of potential record buyers who 
have a positive valuation of the live performance. The demand for good 2, when piracy is an 
option, will therefore always be at least as high as when piracy is impossible. 
 We shall assume that only artists of a quality higher than a certain threshold level, 
    , will be able to tour. This assumption hinges on the repayment structure a contract 
between a record company and artist stipulates. Since the record company does not make any 
direct profit from a concert it can only recover its expenses if the album is of a sufficient  
quality to be profitable in the market. An album that does not sell will not be produced, and an 
artist without an album will not be giving live performances.  
 Lastly, we shall also assume that the price of good 1, the recorded product, is 
exogenous to the artist. Prices are set by the record labels, and have proven to be almost 
immune to changes in their surroundings. According to data, album prices did not change 
significantly between 1999 and 2003, and only in 2004 did we witness a decline in the price 
level (Mortimer and Sorensen, 2005).  
 The framework should now be sufficient to make predictions on how an artist will act 
facing increases in file-sharing. Remembering that the demand for good 1 is given by 
                      
and demand for good 2 is given by 
                                     
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
, 
the first-order condition of the profit function with respect to effort spent on good 1 is 
 
  
   
         
   
   
        
   
   
 
  
   
. 
Assuming that the profit function is concave in   , we find that 
   
 
  
   as long as 
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  . 
Due to the assumptions made, it can be shown that both 
    
     
 and 
    
     
 are negative, which 
leads to the conclusion that, ceteris paribus, an increase in file-sharing will reduce the effort 
artists spend on producing albums. The intuition behind this result is that as piracy increases, 
the marginal benefit of effort on good 1 decreases, while the cost remains constant. The artist 
will, therefore, shift her effort from producing records (good 1) to giving live performances 
(good 2).  
 By the same analogy, it is not surprising that we now find that increased piracy will 
lead to an increased effort on live performances. This can be shown by taking the first-order 
condition of the profit function with respect to effort on good 2 
 
  
   
         
   
   
        
   
   
 
  
   
. 
Assuming that the profit function is concave in   , we will find that effort on live 
performances will increase with piracy if 
 
   
     
         
    
     
        
    
     
   
The assumptions used mean that the first part of this expression is negative. This captures the 
effect that spillovers from concert effort to album sales exist but will decrease when piracy is 
possible. The second part of this expression is positive, by result of our assumptions. 
However, since the first part is multiplied with the artist‟s share of profits,  , the equation 
will hold as long as   is sufficiently small so the second, positive part can outweigh the loss 
captured in the first, negative part. 
 The arguments presented above also imply that revenue from concerts will increase. 
This is because we have argued that profits will (weakly) increase with file-sharing through 
the increase in demand. Since we have assumed marginal costs to be constant (zero), this will 
also mean that revenues must also increase (Mortimer and Sorensen, 2005). This does not 
mean that the price of good 2 will increase, however, as file-sharing‟s impact on concert 
prices is ambiguous. This can be shown by taking the first-order condition of the profit 
function to determine   
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As the demand increases with piracy, there will also be a negative effect on demand from 
higher prices, so the result of increased piracy on concert prices is unclear.  
 Finally, as positive profits from album sales are a necessary assumption to produce 
albums, the effect of piracy will be a higher threshold    to produce an album. An implication 
of this is that there will be fewer artists producing albums, and perhaps also less desire, from 
the publisher‟s side, to release albums of new and unproven artists. 
 Using the data provided by Mortimer and Sorensen it is possible to test the theory 
presented above with actual developments in the recording industry. These data are very 
much in correspondence with what we expect to find. Firstly, the data shows that artists who 
were already established when file-sharing was introduced used more time before releasing 
new albums. Secondly, we see that artists were more likely to tour. Thirdly, it shows that 
revenues from concerts indeed had increased, while the fourth finding is a decline in new 
artists releasing a recorded product. See Appendix A for data.  
 The second and third findings are also confirmed in a report written by Ehmer and 
Porsch for Deutsche Bank Research (2008). They present numbers from the German market, 
the fourth largest in the world,
20
 and find that the music market has changed significantly 
since the mid-90s, a change they partly attribute to the introduction of digitalization of media 
and file-sharing. Since 1995, the market for live concerts has increased by 18 per cent in 
Germany. At the same time the unit sales of the recorded product has declined by 38 per cent  
(Ehmer and Porsch, 2008). Ehmer and Porsch do not test the hypothesis that downloading is 
to blame for the decline in sales but rather accept it as a norm.  
 The article by Mortimer and Sorensen shows that while sales of a good might 
decrease, piracy might lead to an increase in complementary goods. A result brought forth by 
both Croxson and Mortimer and Sorensen is that, given some assumptions, piracy might 
actually increase overall profits due to the effect on complementary goods. If this is the case, 
why do we see such hostility towards piracy from the industry? 
                                               
20See IFPI (2010b) for an overview of the largest markets.  
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6 Artists vs. Publishers 
The answer lies within the basis of Mortimer and Sorensen‟s article: the potentially 
increased profit does not benefit the publisher, as the artist takes the entire revenue from live 
performances. In a sense, there is a conflict of interest between the record label and the artist. 
This is the essence of an article by Gayer and Shy called “Publishers, artists, and copyright 
enforcement” (2006). In their article, Gayer and Shy treat publishers and artists as two 
separate agents, whereas most other articles on this topic treat the copyright holder as one and 
the same. This is, of course, simplifying reality. It is tempting to believe that publishers and 
artists might view piracy differently, especially when one considers the results put forward in 
the Mortimer and Sorensen paper, regarding the increased demand for live performances. We 
shall therefore build a model in line with Gayer and Shy (2006) to test the hypothesis that 
piracy might indeed affect the two agents differently. 
 The key assumption is that, as above, the artists only earn a fraction of the income 
generated by the copyrighted good but receive the entire revenue from a complimentary good, 
usually assumed to be the live performance. Demand for the live performance is assumed to 
be positively related to the distribution of the copyrighted good, regardless of it being legally 
or illegally obtained. Consumers can choose to hold a legal or illegal copy of the copyrighted 
good, or they can choose not to obtain a copy. A network effect arises from holding a copy, 
which is increasing in the number of consumers who obtain a copy. This is denoted by   , 
where     is a measure of the marginal benefit from the network size  . In addition, 
consumers are indexed by            according to a declining preference for obtaining the 
copyrighted product. The utility function of a consumer is then 
     
            
         
 
  
where the top line indicates the utility of a consumer who buys a legal copy; the middle line is 
the utility of a consumer who obtains a pirated copy; and the bottom line is the utility of a 
consumer who does not obtain a copy at all. The declining preference assumption can be 
observed by setting     in the utility functions above, where such negativity in the first part 
may indicate that the consumer is unhappy about spending time and effort finding the 
product. The price of purchasing a legal copy,   , also enters negatively in the utility function 
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of the consumer who buys the copyrighted product. Note also that even though these aspects 
enter negatively, the user will still derive a positive utility if she consumes, as she will rather 
go without and derive zero utility than obtaining a good that gives her disutility. 
 Two assumptions are implied by the utility functions given above. Firstly, there is a 
vertical differentiation of the legally- and illegally obtained goods,        .     is 
needed for consumers to prefer the legal good, should the price of this be set to zero. Imagine 
that the legal good is easier or safer to use than the pirated version (no virus, etc.) or that it 
contains a booklet with artwork not given when downloading online. We also need   to be 
bounded below the utility parameters. This is a basic assumption in network models to ensure 
that the number of user does not approach infinity. Secondly, we assume that the production 
cost,  , is lower than the utility difference for a consumer of obtaining the legal copy rather 
than the illegal. Formally, we note this as      . This is needed for there to be a 
production of the legal copy at all.  
 We then assume, as we did above, that the demand for the live performance is 
increasing in the distribution of the copyrighted product, both legal and illegal distribution. 
Denoting the price of a concert ticket as    the demand is given as  
                , 
where     is the intensity in which distribution of the recorded product affects the demand 
for live performances. This specification of the demand hinges on our previously stated 
assumption that live performances and recorded products are compliments.  
 Acting as a monopolist, the artist now sets ticket prices for the live performance in 
order to maximize profits for a given number of consumers. She thus solves 
                     , 
which yields the following price and profit from live performances 
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These expressions show how the ticket price and the profits increase linearly and 
quadratically, respectively, with the number of distributed recordings. In other words, the 
artist could theoretically find it profitable to allow piracy of her own copyrighted works. 
 None of this is new or very exciting at this point.  Showing that the artist might find it 
profitable to allow piracy is the basic result from section 4 and section 5. Our current model 
differs from these models however, as we now go on to show how the artist and the publisher 
might have different opinions on the profitability of piracy. In order to do so, we solve for the 
equilibrium sales, with piracy and without piracy, for both the copyrighted recorded product 
and for the live performance, and compare these static results. This way we show that, given 
the assumptions made, there is a plausible reason to believe that the artist will be better off 
with piracy, while the publisher will be worse off.  
 Using the marginal user from the middle and bottom line in the utility function above 
we find that the number of users is equal to the marginal user‟s indexed variable, meaning 
   . Substituting this into the middle line gives 
   
 
   
 
as the number of users of the copyrighted good, regardless of whether it was obtained legally 
or not. The marginal buyer, defined as  , is the one indifferent between the top and middle 
line in the utility function above. Setting those equations equal to each other and inserting the 
number of users   from above gives us the marginal buyer as 
   
      
   
. 
 In line with what has been done in similar articles, we shall also attribute only a small 
share,  , of the profit from the copyrighted product to the artist, while the rest goes to the 
publisher, where       is a necessary and unsurprising assumption. Recalling that there 
is a cost     attached to produce each copyrighted product, the publisher sets the price of 
the product,   , to solve 
                                      
      
   
, 
which gives us the following characteristics of the legal product: 
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For the artist, the profit will stem from selling tickets to the live performance and the royalties 
from the sale of the recorded product. Formally, this is written as 
           
    
       
  
        
      
 
For any conclusion to be made we need to find the no piracy counterpoints to these results. 
Eliminating the opportunity to obtain a pirated copy, the number of users also becomes the 
number of buyers. The utility function then gives us 
   
    
   
 
The publisher‟s problem can then be written as 
                                      
    
   
 
Solving that problem yields the following results for the publisher 
    
   
 
 
   
   
      
 
    
      
      
 
The artist‟s total profit is still the profit made from performing live and the royalties from 
selling the copyrighted product. Using the new size of the network and new profit found in 
the no piracy case, the total profit accruing to the artist is now given as 
           
        
        
  
      
      
 
The information above can now be used in order to analyze who would gain from piracy and 
who would lose, and under what circumstances would those results hold. Whereas previously, 
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our results only stated that there is a potential result in favor of piracy, we now look at a result 
where this might still be the case but where it would also explain why the recording industry 
has spent vast amounts of time and resources on lawsuits against civilians and organizations 
to stop file-sharing. To see why, we first compare the profit expression for the publisher in the 
no piracy case with the result in which piracy prevailed. Using these, and the assumption that 
the publisher prefers no piracy, we see that advocating enforcement and pursuing stronger 
copyright protection is the preferred action if 
      
      
      
      
        
      
 
A brief inspection of the above condition tells us that such a result is not straight forward. On 
the one hand,   enters the right hand side of the equation in the numerator in a negative 
fashion, making the expression smaller than the left hand side. On the other hand,   also 
enters the denominator in a negative way, but this will make the expression larger, especially 
since we earlier stated the assumption that    . The condition therefore hinges on the size 
of the parameters but the result above is still valid as a necessary condition for the publisher 
to pursue stronger copyright enforcements. 
 By analogy, the artist will also seek stronger copyright enforcement if her profit 
without piracy exceeds what she could get when piracy is possible. Formally, we state this as 
 
        
        
  
      
      
 
    
       
  
        
      
 
The implication of this condition is that the artist will prefer no piracy to piracy if   is 
sufficiently small, and/or   is sufficiently large. In other words, if the distribution of the 
copyrighted good does not have much of an impact on the demand of the live performance 
(small  ) or if the artist‟s share of the profit from album sales (large  ), then the artist will 
want a stronger protection of her copyrighted work. Formally, this will be the case if 
       
where   can be shown to satisfy 
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 If the condition above holds, then both artist and publisher will wish to seek stronger 
protection of the copyrighted material in order to maximize their own profit. However, should 
the networking spillover effect, as captured by  , be stronger or the royalties given to the 
artist, measured by  , be smaller, then it might be the case that the (weak) inequality sign 
runs the other way. If that is the case, then the artist and publisher will have conflicting 
interests in the fight against piracy. The spillover value, where the artist will be indifferent 
between allowing piracy or not, will be 
    
 
 
 
We can illustrate in a       diagram how this trade-off between distribution effect and 
royalties will unfold for the artist. 
 
The above figure depends on piracy not being profitable for the publisher. The trade-off is 
therefore only valid for the artist. It shows that, the higher the value of  , the more unlikely it 
is that piracy will be profitable for the artist. Likewise, the higher the spillover effect from the 
distribution of the copyrighted good,  , the more likely is it that the artist will prefer piracy to 
prevail in order to reap the benefits of sold out live performances. 
  
  
   
 
 
 
Artist finds piracy profitable 
Artist does not find piracy 
profitable 
Figure 3:       diagram 
Source: Gayer and Shy (2006) 
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 The model above, and its predictions, is important when actual numbers are taken into 
consideration. A Pew Internet & American Life Project survey from 2004 found that 43 per 
cent of paid artists agreed to the statement “file-sharing services are not really bad for artists, 
since they help to promote and distribute an artist‟s work to a broad audience” (Gayer and 
Shy, 2006, p. 375). Moreover, 35 per cent of the artists felt that file-sharing should be legal 
(ibid.). At the same time, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) announced 
its plans to file lawsuits against individuals who were caught file-sharing, as well as against 
individuals and organizations that set up or hosted the servers the file-sharing networks used 
(Liebowitz, 2006). These lawsuits commenced in late 2003, and the first wave saw 261 
individuals sued for illegal sharing of copyrighted music online. Clearly, these are indications 
that the artist and the publisher might have conflicting interests in the case of file-sharing. The 
RIAA has now stopped its lawsuit campaign against individuals and states that it has been a 
success, claiming awareness of the illegality of piracy has been raised from 35 to 72 per cent 
as a result of the legal actions taken.
21
 In this paper, however, we have also argued that 
individuals do not care that file-sharing is illegal, implying that this awareness might not be 
worth much. 
 The model above has assumed that artists only get a small share of the profits from 
sales of the recorded good but the entire profit from the live performance. This is a model that 
describes the previous reality in a realistic, yet simplified, manner. Having witnessed the 
changes in income and the decline in sales the past decade, both record companies and 
concert promoters have increasingly started using “360-degree deals” (Ehmer and Porsch, 
2008). These are contracts where the record companies take upon themselves the 
responsibilities, and hence also profits, arising from live performances. Where the record 
companies usually paid for production, distribution and advertisement of a recording, they 
now also have an increasing say in the marketing of concerts and merchandising, on behalf of 
the artist. The line between label, agency, distributor and promoter has thus become 
increasingly blurred as a result of smaller profit shares from the recorded product. An 
example of how this has already become a reality is the introduction of “American Idol”-style 
TV-shows, where the winning artist usually wins a recording- and touring deal with the 
affiliated recording company. 
                                               
21 http://www.riaa.com/faq.php, accessed October 5th 2010 
34 
 
7 Piracy and Innovation 
Standard economic theory tells us that piracy should decrease a firm‟s incentives to 
innovate and to engage in research and development (R&D). When potential profits are 
lowered, the firm will see less reason to spend money on new inventions. To avoid this, 
copyrights have been installed to make sure that the owner of a good is financially 
compensated, and given incentives to innovate. Despite the threat of piracy, digital media 
industries like the music, movie, and software industries are among the most innovative we 
have today, and estimates say that record companies on average re-invests almost 30 per cent 
of their revenue into discovering and releasing new artists (IFPI, 2010a). Rayna (2004) 
attributes this paradox to piracy breaking the monopoly created by copyrights, leading 
producers and publishers to compete with the pirates for market share.  
The economics of copyrights is a two-step analysis: first, one distinguishes between 
rival and non-rival goods. Then, one analyses the welfare effects of the copyright on the two 
types of goods. If the good in question is a rival good, then strong copyrights will lead to 
efficient outcomes (Romer, 2002). We have, however, argued that due to the technological 
change the past ten years that has made file-sharing frequent, music files have now become 
more similar to non-rival goods. This, according to Nordhaus (1969), means that there will be 
a trade-off arising from copyrights. With weak copyrights we will get an under-provision of 
the good, while strong copyrights will create a monopoly situation. Hall (2003) argues that a 
copyright system might be a needed to give incentives for further innovation if the product is 
easily copied. 
The concept of innovation is diffuse when it comes to music. In most industries, 
innovation would mean inventing new technologies or making existing technologies more 
productive. If music is considered innovative, it usually means that they have taken their 
genre one step further, but this by no means implies that they will be more productive. Rather, 
innovation, when it comes to the music industry in the economics literature, either refers to its 
ability or willingness to release new artists,
22
 or to its methods of attaining and retaining 
market share. 
This latter type of innovation can take two different forms: it could refer to 
technological innovations to make it more costly for the pirates to copy the product, or it 
                                               
22 As in Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) 
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could refer to innovations to enhance the quality gap between the original and the copy. 
According to Rayna, this first kind is “useless” innovation and does nothing but increase the 
size of the deadweight loss caused by copyrights. The second kind of innovation could, 
however, lead to welfare enhancements and is thus looked upon as desirable.  
 
 
In panel (a) above, we have depicted the standard monopoly case, with no piracy 
possible. The publisher then sells at the monopoly price, causing a deadweight-loss, as 
pictured in the lower right corner. In panel (b) we have introduced piracy at zero marginal 
cost, and assumed that only „low value‟ consumers will commit piracy. This means that there 
is no displacement of sales, and the deadweight-loss in panel (a) simply turns into a consumer 
surplus. As the „high value‟ consumers still purchase, the publisher will still act as in a 
standard monopoly case, and her revenue is unchanged. In panel (c), we have still allowed the 
opportunity of „low value‟ consumers to pirate, but this time there is a cost attached to it 
because of copyrights. We see that there is a deadweight-loss arising, compared to the “no 
cost to copying” case of panel (b). Note, however, that the results are quite different if the 
pirates are „high value‟ consumers. This will lead to quite an increase in the consumer surplus 
but at the expense of the publisher‟s revenue. 
The intuition behind Rayna‟s comment is straight forward. Innovations to make piracy 
more costly could, for example, include copy controls. Though these, theoretically, would 
decrease the number of illegal copies in circulation, the discussion above has shown that the 
increase in sales might not be substantial. The copy control would indisputably decrease the 
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Figure 4: Evolution of consumer surplus and deadweight loss 
Source: Rob and Waldfogel (2004) 
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number of those able to enjoy the product as illegal acquirement becomes much more difficult 
and time consuming. Moreover, it would decrease the possibility of those who have acquired 
the product legally to use it where they see fit, since copy control usually puts restrictions on 
compatible players, thus decreasing the overall enjoyment of the product. So while the effect 
on producer surplus might be ambiguous, the effect on consumer surplus is unambiguously 
negative. Total welfare will thus be ambiguously affected, but most likely negatively. 
 On the other hand, innovations that increase the quality gap between copies and 
originals will unambiguously increase total welfare. These kinds of innovation will still allow 
for copies to be made and thus for piracy to exist. However, if there is a significant difference 
in quality between the original and the copy, only those who have a valuation under the price 
level will choose to obtain a copy. This means that those who copy would not have bought the 
product if piracy was not an option anyway. This will unambiguously increase total welfare as 
consumer surplus will increase and producer surplus will not be negatively affected.  
 Håkonsen and Løyland (2009) argue that an opposite form of product differentiation 
innovation has become reality. Rather than producers innovating at such pace as to keep 
copiers at bay, they say that innovation with respect to the copies moves at a more rapid pace 
than innovation in the legal product. This would then have the effect of enticing an increasing 
number of consumers to opt for the pirated version, as the quality of it becomes increasingly 
better and closer to that of the original. One should note that this kind of innovation, from the 
pirate‟s side, is not necessarily negative, as seen from the social welfare side, though this has 
largely been ignored in the literature. Innovations intended for illegal use might very well 
help encourage new, legal and socially beneficial innovations as well. As an example, legal 
online broadcast technology, as well as file compression techniques for 3G mobile phones, 
are both based on Mpeg4-algorithms, which started as an algorithm of compressing video 
files to a downloadable size (Rayna, 2004).  
 An analysis of how copyrights might affect digital goods is presented in Bae and Choi 
(2006). They assume that there are two different types of costs attached to copying, namely 
„reproduction‟ costs and „degradation‟ costs. The first cost is our standard cost of actually 
copying, and thus an opportunity cost. The latter is a representation of the lesser quality 
offered by the copy. For instance, this could be the lack of manuals for software, or the lack 
of cover art and lyrics in the case of music. Their finding is that the effect on welfare and 
innovation depends on which of these two costs is affected by the copyright. Moreover, the 
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standard economic rationale for copyrights only applies if the copyright increases the 
degradation cost. This would increase the publisher‟s market power in the short run which has 
a negative effect on social welfare. The increased market power, however, will induce the 
publisher to provide higher quality through innovation, thus benefitting social welfare in the 
long run (Bae and Choi, 2006). The copy protections advocated and used on musical 
recordings, however, cannot be said to increase the degradation cost, as we have previously 
argued. Instead, it is aimed at increasing the reproduction cost. This will have an opposite 
effect, as there will be less incentive in the long run for the publisher to provide higher quality 
when copying is difficult (Rayna, 2004). 
 Jaisingh (2009) has analyzed the effect of copyright control on the software market. 
He builds a framework where there is a software company, a copier, and an alliance of 
businesses campaigning against piracy. He finds that if the company has the market leading 
product and the effort by the alliance is low, the company should set prices low in order to 
drive the pirate out of the market. If it has a weaker product and the alliance is heavily 
involved in the fight against piracy, the company should rather set higher prices and leave a 
small part of its market to the pirate. The most interesting finding is that even though strict 
anti-piracy measures increase the cost of using a copied version, it might have a negative 
effect on product quality. This will, in turn, give increased incentive for copying. Thus, he 
finds that stricter copyright enforcement policies might actually lead to more piracy. 
 These findings sound counter-intuitive, but are in line with what have been discussed 
above. Facing competition from piracy, it might be in the producer‟s own interest to develop 
new and better versions of its product. If the difference between the original and the copy is 
small, then the incentive to purchase the original might decline. In this respect, the copyright 
might therefore have the opposite effect than intended when competition arises from an illegal 
market.   
 Another aspect of strengthening the copyright is that there might be high costs 
attached to strengthening it to a level where it has an impact on illegal copying. Not only will 
there be direct costs, like surveillance and legal prosecutions, but also indirect costs like the 
spillover effect of the stronger copyright (Romer, 2002). These indirect costs might very well 
outweigh the direct ones, especially if they put constraints on consumer‟s legal use of a good, 
or if these constraints also hinders innovation in other technological industries (Håkonsen and 
Løyland, 2009). 
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 It seems that the current copyright scheme is not able to stem file-sharing online. 
Liebowitz (2007) attribute the trend-breaking increase in record sales in 2001 to the Napster-
case. Nonetheless, consumers willing to settle for pirated versions rapidly found other 
alternatives to attain copies of their favorite songs virtually for free. Therefore, the industry 
has lobbied intensively for stricter copyright enforcement. These enforcements could 
potentially come at a much greater cost than the music industry is worth. Despite the 
relatively large numbers presented in the „Cost of Piracy‟ section above, the total worldwide 
revenue for the music industry in 2000 was $37 billion. This translates to approximately 0.11 
per cent of world GDP (Romer, 2002). Thus, the world economy would not tremble if record 
companies went out of business due to piracy. 
 A more likely scenario is that the record companies alter their business methods. We 
have already witnessed innovations in the distributional platform, such as iTunes and 
Spotify.
23
 Sweden was one of very few markets that had an increase in record sales in 2009. 
The industry itself attributes this to an increase in digital sales, led by iTunes and especially 
Spotify. A study found that 60 per cent of file-sharers stopped downloading music after the 
introduction of Spotify (IFPI, 2010b). Innovations like these, it seems, both increase legal 
sales and reduce illegal downloading. A report by the Council for Economic Development 
(Horn et. al, 2004) argues that the only way for the music industry to survive is to adopt new 
business models. 
A study by Harbaugh and Khemka (2010) shows that the tradeoff between stricter 
enforcement and incentives to innovate can be avoided if discrimination is possible. By 
discrimination they mean both price discrimination and enforcement-discrimination. Like the 
studies mentioned above, Harbaugh and Khemka also show that more efforts spent on 
copyright enforcement will not necessarily work in line with textbook economic theory. Their 
claim is that piracy will be reduced, prices will increase, and consumer surplus will be lower 
when enforcement is more intensive. However, if the enforcement effort is targeted at specific 
groups, the trade-off can be avoided.  This is particularly true where the copyright holder is 
charging super-monopoly prices to high-value customers. 
 The idea is that when the copyright holder charges super-monopoly prices to high-
value customers (e.g. institutions or governments, if the good in question is software, libraries 
if it is journals and magazines) then this might lead low-value customers to switch to pirated 
                                               
23 Neither of these, interestingly enough, were innovations by the record companies. 
39 
 
copies instead of the high-priced legal copies. If the copyright holder now extends her narrow 
enforcement further down the demand curve it will benefit inframarginal consumers when the 
price is lowered down towards the monopoly level.
24
 The important finding in their paper is 
that this gain to inframarginal consumers will outweigh the losses incurred by marginal 
consumers who now must buy the expensive legal version rather than obtaining the cheaper 
pirated copy. If so, then the more extensive copyright enforcement will lead to higher profits 
for the copyright holder and also higher consumer surplus.  
 A requirement for this increase in consumer surplus to arise from more extensive 
enforcement is that the pirated copies are poor substitutes for the legal original versions. 
Following the intuition from Reyna (2004), this means that there is a case for innovation 
incentives arising from this increase in enforcement. However, it is reasonable to believe that 
the copyright holder does not take consumer surplus into account when deciding whether or 
not she wants to engage in R&D. Chen and Png (2003) find that it is more plausible that the 
copyright holder rather chooses a too high level of broad-based enforcement. Unlike in the 
extensive enforcement discussed in Harbaugh and Khemka, more intensive enforcement here 
will have a negative effect on consumer surplus. Chen and Png‟s finding is thus that there will 
be an inefficiently high level of enforcement, and indirectly an inefficiently low level of 
innovation resulting from the copyright (Harbaugh and Khemka, 2010). 
 Stepping away from the question of copyrights and copy controls and into the 
minefield that is the discussion of quality of music, there have been voiced concerns about 
innovation in this area as well (Rayna, 2004). We have previously argued that innovation 
within music can be looked upon as the industry‟s willingness to release new albums and new 
artists. Though numbers are difficult to come by, an IFPI estimate says that 25 per cent of all 
artists signed on a typical international record label were signed during the previous 12 
months (IFPI, 2010a). The same study does say that these numbers are in decline, however, 
and attribute this to file-sharing. Other signs of this reluctance to invest in new artists and 
albums are indicated by the high number of compilations released worldwide. A compilation 
is an album consisting of songs previously released. It could either be a „Greatest Hits‟ 
compilation, featuring only songs by the same artists, or it could be a „genre‟ compilation, 
featuring songs by different artists. Such albums constituted as much as 30 per cent of some 
                                               
24
 The inframarginal consumer is the consumer whose willingness to pay is right below the marginal 
consumer’s. 
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markets in 2009 (IFPI, 2010b). Releasing the same songs on new albums is surely not a sign 
of innovation. 
 Also, fears have been raised that this decreasing willingness to sign new artists will 
lead up-and-coming musicians into a “Keynesian beauty contest” (Rayna, 2004). By this is 
meant that the artists rather than sounding the way they want to sound, they try to sound like 
they think that the record company wants them to sound. Musicians then “devote [their] 
intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be” (Keynes, 
1936, p. 140). Again, this will most likely not be a very innovative outcome. 
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8 Policy Implications 
The discussions and models presented above should make one thing quite clear; there 
are many aspects to consider when facing a problem such as piracy. The situation is much 
more multi-faceted than media discussions might have us believe. Publishers are claiming that 
every illegally downloaded item is a lost sale. We have shown that this is probably not true 
and at best an over-simplification. But it is still true that the publishers are losing money, and 
it might be reasonable to attribute at least parts of this loss to the emergence of a digital piracy 
market. This raises another important question on how piracy and the digital market should be 
dealt with from a governance perspective. 
 A supervising organ‟s aim should always be to maximize the total welfare of its 
society. However, all policy instruments will have altering effects on the economic situation. 
While the welfare-optimal situation might be to leave the market alone, this might very well 
lead to an under-provision of the recorded product, since the potential profits are lost to 
piracy. A policy instrument to implement a second-best situation might therefore be needed. 
There are usually three tools that are deemed suitable for evaluation: taxes on copying 
mediums, subsidies on buying the legal product, or imposing penalties if caught acquiring the 
illegal product. Chen and Png (2003) analyze the various instruments in the case of software 
and piracy but their results can easily be interpreted to apply to the music industry as well. 
8.1 Effect on the Publisher’s Price and Detection Cost 
 The implementation of taxes on copying mediums is a strategy that has been 
frequently advocated and used in the history of copying. In the 80s, taxes on blank video 
cassettes were put into place to shield off competition from home recorders, and taxes on CD-
burners and blank recordable CDs also existed during the late 90s and early 00s. Recently, we 
have also seen the introduction of multimedia-taxes, as in Denmark, where computer, phones, 
or other devices that can connect to the Internet are subject to taxation. These taxes have also 
been an instrument favored by the recording industry (Chen and Png, 2003). 
 We shall continue to make assumptions in line with what we have done above: there is 
a cost attached to catch copiers, but the marginal cost of producing (and hence copying) is 
zero. In addition, there are some consumers who will not copy the product at all (referred to 
as „ethical‟), and there are some consumers who would copy the product if the benefits from 
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doing so are greater than the costs (referred to as „unethical‟). In this model, the government 
first chooses a fine, a tax, and a subsidy. Note that it may choose combinations of the 
instruments. Then, the publisher will set its price and how much it chooses to spend on 
detecting pirates. Lastly, the consumers decide whether they will buy, copy, or not use the 
product. 
 The model can be solved backwards. First we find under what conditions the ethical 
and unethical users will be indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing the product. An 
important finding is that for the unethical consumer there will be two cut-off values; one 
where she is indifferent between buying and copying, and one where she is indifferent 
between copying and not using the product at all. These cut-off values will depend on the 
benefit the consumer derives from the product; an unethical user with a relatively high value 
will rather copy than be without the product, while an ethical user will be more likely to 
purchase if she has a high valuation of the product. A graph indicates these points clearly: 
 
  
The figure indicates that those unethical individuals who have a valuation that is high 
enough,     , will buy the product. The individuals who have too low of a valuation, 
    , will be without the product. It is the intermediate cases that are of the highest interest. 
Benefit from buying, v 
Expected benefit from 
copying, (1- )v 
        
      
          
price/unit 
quantity 
p 
Figure 5: Benefits from, and demand for, good, with piracy 
Source: Chen and Png (2003) 
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These are the individuals who are prone to copy. Notice that the expected benefit from 
copying will increase if the price is higher, or if the possibility of detection increases. 
 Since copying does occur, the publisher will set its price and detection expenditure 
subject to the government policy instruments, which is taken as given, so as to maximize its 
own profit. Doing this we find that the price will be increasing in the penalty, and that it will 
increase more slowly than the subsidy. The detection rate will also be increasing in the fine, 
but it will be decreasing in the tax and in the subsidy. 
 The intuition is as follows. If the penalty for being caught increases, then fewer 
individuals will opt for the pirated version. This is indicated by the figure above. This can 
lead the publisher to increase her price. Likewise, if the potential reward for catching pirates 
increases then it will make sense to increase spending on detecting them. Also, as the product 
is sold at a higher price, the potential loss from copying has increased, leading the publisher to 
increase her spending on detection.  
 A tax increase, however, would affect the marginal return of detection in a negative 
way. This is because some of the lost revenue from a sale would accrue to the government 
instead of the publisher. Hence, the publisher will be lead to decrease her spending on 
detection of pirates. Note, however that a tax increase will indirectly lead the publisher to 
increase her price, something that should lead to an increase in detection spending. But as this 
indirect effect will be outweighed by the direct effect from the tax, the overall effect will be a 
decrease in the detection spending. 
8.2 Effects on Social Welfare 
 In economic theory illegal copying is usually seen as affecting social welfare in two 
ways: it reduces the incentive of publishers to innovate and produce, leading to an 
underprovision of the product; and it allows some users who have a valuation higher than the 
marginal cost of production, but lower than the price to consume the product (Novos and 
Waldman, 1984). Chen and Png (2003) add that the publisher‟s expenditure on detection also 
will be a welfare consequence of copying. Since the product in their framework already has 
been developed there is no such thing as underprovision. We can therefore look at detection 
expenditure and the possibility of improved utilization. Adopting a utilitarian viewpoint, the 
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total social welfare will include the net expected benefit of both ethical and unethical 
consumers, as well as the publisher‟s profit and the government‟s net revenue. 
 The results from this exercise are that both the price and the detection rate can be 
reduced in a welfare enhancing way without affecting the publisher‟s sales. The intuition is 
that a lower price can substitute for detection. Note that detection deprives consumers with 
too low valuation to purchase the good the possibility to use it. Thus, detection has a negative 
impact on a utilitarian social welfare model. An increase in the detection rate will lead to less 
copying and a lower consumer surplus, but this reduction will not benefit the publisher. This 
follows from the fact that she spends at least as much as she earns from the reduced piracy on 
detecting the piracy. The overall result is therefore that more detection will not lead to an 
increase in social welfare. 
 A lower price will also induce the lower segment of copiers to purchase the product 
legally.  In addition, it will also induce more ethical consumers to make a purchase. Thus, 
though both a lower price and a lower detection rate have similar effects on social welfare, 
pricing should be viewed as a more socially responsible way to act facing competition from 
piracy. 
 Intuitively, these results tell us that a government should impose a tax on the 
complementarities rather than a fine on copying. Recall that the price is increasing in the fine, 
and that the detection expenditure is increasing in the price. Above, we have seen that both of 
these effects will negatively affect social welfare. Since the effects of a tax on the price are 
ambiguous, and a tax has been shown to reduce detection expenditure, we can make the 
conclusion that a tax should be preferred to a fine if the policy aim is to increase social 
welfare. 
 An obvious drawback of the tax on recording mediums is that its reach is too wide. 
Although recording mediums as blank CD-Rs and CD-burners are used for illegal copying 
there are also legal uses attached to these products. A tax will therefore „punish‟ someone for 
a crime they are not necessarily committing. It could therefore be that a subsidy on the 
legitimate purchase of the recorded good would be the better policy instrument of the three 
discussed. A subsidy will decrease the price and thus stimulate more legitimate purchases. 
Also, facing a lower price on her good the publisher will expend fewer resources on detection 
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which will also lead to increased usage and higher social welfare. This is in line with the 
arguments put forth by Plant (1934), as mentioned in section 2. 
8.3 What Kind of Enforcement is Optimal? 
 Above, we have been focusing on broad-based enforcement. This is the standard case 
in copyright economics, and it raises the price equally for all individuals facing piracy. 
Examples could be taxes on piracy complementaries like recordable CDs, portable mp3-
players, VHS players, photocopiers etc. Thus, broad-based enforcement induces a cost to 
piracy. We can illustrate this graphically like below: 
 
 
  
In the figure,    is the marginal pirate. She will be indifferent between copying or not using 
the product at all. The marginal consumer, indicated by   , will be indifferent between buying 
the product, or copying it. This is therefore also the quantity of sales, and the price is 
indicated by      . An increase in the price of copying will be represented by an upward 
movement of  . It is quite clear that consumer surplus decreases as the cost of copying goes 
up. A higher level of   will move    to the left, and the price curve to the left of the kink will 
   1 
1 
CS 
     
       
value/demand 
index of      
individuals/quantity 
     
       
      
CS 
  
Figure 6: Effect of broad-based enforcement 
Source: Harbaugh and Khemka (2010) 
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be shifted upwards. This allows the copyright holder to charge a higher price for the good, 
since the competition from illegal copying has become more expensive. Thus, broad-based 
copyright enforcement will have the effect wanted by the record industry, as it lowers the 
level of piracy. However, from a policy perspective, it might not be the desirable result. 
Higher prices for both legal and illegal copies will unambiguously decrease consumer surplus. 
Higher prices for the same quantity will, however, increase the publisher‟s profit, leaving the 
effect on total surplus ambiguous.  
 This transition will only go as far as to the point where the publisher can charge 
monopoly prices. After this, more broad-based enforcement will not result in higher profits 
for the publisher as she will still choose to produce at the monopoly level. Thus, further 
increases after    will not affect consumer surplus, publisher‟s profit, nor total surplus.  
A study by Harbaugh and Khemka (2010) finds that targeted, rather than broad-based, 
copyright enforcement might increase both the publisher‟s profit and the consumer surplus. 
Targeted copyright enforcement works in a similar manner as price discrimination,
25
 and can 
be viewed as the relevant case for both the music industry and the software industry. The 
software industry usually charges higher prices to institutions, governments, and companies 
since they know that these are usually not prone to making illegal copies. Similarly, record 
companies usually enjoy higher copyright enforcements in richer countries where the demand 
for their products is higher than in poorer countries. Thus, the situation where a copyright-
holder enjoys targeted enforcement can be drawn as in figure 7 below. 
In the graph below,      is the demand for the legitimate product while      is the 
demand for the pirated copy. The point    is the index of copyright enforcement. All buyers 
     are subject to enforcement discrimination and can only purchase the legal version, 
while all buyers      may purchase a pirated copy. This gives two separate demand curves; 
the publisher charges a super-monopoly price,      , in the market with strict enforcement, 
    . For quantities higher than    the publisher faces competition from the piracy market, 
and can therefore not set a price higher than          . The inverse demand functions, 
       , is marked in the graph as the thicker downward sloping lines. 
                                               
25 If there is targeted enforcement there might also be possible to have price discrimination. 
47 
 
 
  
 
 Denote the lowest quantity that would that leaves the publisher indifferent between 
competition and no-competition as  . When the enforcement extent is lower than this,     , 
it will be profitable for the firm to engage in competition with the piracy market, selling its 
quantity at a competitively low price. When the enforcement reaches   the firm will switch to 
selling fewer units at a super-monopoly price, inducing higher profits. Further enforcement 
increases will only benefit the publisher who can now sell at the higher price to even more 
consumers. This will be the case until the enforcement reaches the monopoly level,   , where 
the firm will engage in standard monopolist sales. 
 Consumer surplus will not surprisingly be higher the less enforcement there is, even 
with targeted enforcement. Therefore, the consumer surplus falls dramatically when 
enforcement is changed at     . Any further increases of the enforcement will act slightly 
positive on consumer surplus since the price is falling slightly towards the monopoly level, 
until we reach      . If the enforcement is extended further after this, it will only hurt 
those who would not buy but would copy as the quantity and price would still have remained 
at monopoly level. Thus, any       surely will only have a negative effect on consumer 
surplus.  
      
   1 
1 
CS 
CS 
     
        
value/demand 
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individuals/ 
quantity 
     
     
Figure 7: Effect of targeted enforcement 
Source: Harbaugh and Khemka (2010) 
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 Comparing broad-based enforcement with targeted enforcement provides important 
results with policy implications. We saw that increasing broad-based enforcement not only 
reduced consumer surplus, but it also reduced piracy. Targeted enforcement on the other 
hand, had first a very negative effect on consumer surplus as the publisher shifted from 
engaging in a competitive environment to acting as a super-monopolist to a „captured‟ market. 
As enforcement continued to increase, however, the price was lowered in the „captured‟ 
market, and consumer surplus grew as consumers chose the superior legal good instead of the 
pirated copy. If the digital media industry is a market such that enforcement targeted at high-
value individuals is possible, then this shows that enforcement strong enough to induce 
monopoly level output is the socially preferred options.  
 Worth noting is that consumer surplus is the highest when enforcement is not in place, 
forcing the publisher to compete with piracy and set prices low enough to capture parts of the 
market. However, this would not be the most profitable situation for the publisher. But, unlike 
the situation with broad-based enforcement, both consumer surplus and the copyright holder‟s 
profit can be seen to increase when enforcement increases from its minimum level to the 
monopoly level. Thus, targeted copyright enforcement would be a more socially-preferred 
option to broad-based enforcement. 
8.4 Effect on Consumer Distribution 
 In section 4 on promotional piracy, we argued that there are different distributional 
relationships in different markets. Products aimed at a young consumer base will usually 
depict a negative relationship between the valuation of the good and the personal cost of 
copying it. The distribution function is thus a downward sloping curve in a     space. A 
typical product that fits this description would be computer games. On the other side, goods 
aimed at a more mature and professional clientele, like business software, will be represented 
by a positive     relationship. We argued that the relationship for musical recordings is 
unclear but noted that most other studies assume a negative relationship, arguing that music is 
mostly a product aimed at a teenage and young adult audience. If this is the case, then piracy 
will not have a positive promotional effect on the publisher‟s profit, but rather act as a 
displacement of sales. We‟ll now see that the policy tools can alter the distribution curve.  
 Stricter copyrights or copyrights enforcements, or taxes on piracy complements, will 
all increase an individual‟s perceived cost of piracy. Remember that we said that personal 
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income was a third factor that connected the valuation of the product and the personal cost of 
piracy. A suitable form for the cost of piracy function is then
26
 
        
where   is a fixed cost component of piracy, say, the cost of a blank recordable CD, and   is a 
measure of sensitivity to changes in income   on piracy costs. For example,   could be a 
measure of how easy it is to copy a record to a blank recordable disc, or how long it takes an 
individual to find a non-corrupted file online.    is then simply the opportunity cost of 
spending your time finding or producing the illegal copy rather than working.  
 A tax on piracy complements like recordable discs will now be seen as an increase in 
 . The marginal cost of piracy is, in this case, the same as before but the fixed cost to enter 
piracy increases. This will lead to a straight parallel shift to the right in the downward sloping 
distribution curve, as illustrated below: 
 
 
 
A publisher can, in this scenario, rid the market of harmful piracy, which as we remember 
related to the individuals in the top-left corner of figure 1, by increasing   enough, while 
keeping the price at the monopoly level,   . It is shown in Appendix B that setting     
  ensures that harmful piracy does not occur. 
                                               
26 As in Croxson (2009) 
  
  
Figure 8: Effect on distribution curve,   increases 
Source: Croxson (2009) 
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 A stricter copyright protection, heavier copyright enforcement efforts, or higher 
penalties for those who copy illegally will increase the   variable. Straight derivation shows 
that an increase in   changes the slope of the distribution curve. Graphically, it can be 
represented as below: 
Again, the publisher can rid the market of harmful piracy by increasing   sufficiently. It is 
easy to understand from the figure above that „sufficiently‟ in this current example is in fact 
„infinite‟, since the locus of the new curve still is situated in the top-left corner that indicates 
displaced sales. 
 Notice, however, that if the music market is characterized by a positive     
relationship, the results become the opposite. An increase in the fixed cost,  , would now 
remove the promotional piracy from the market, without increasing sales. An increase in   
would give the distribution curve a flatter slope. This means that the potential of promotional 
piracy would decrease in this case as well. A publisher therefore needs to be sure of the 
distribution of potential customers to be sure of the market effects of copy protection. 
 This section has shown that the publisher can limit the amount of piracy of her 
products but that it might not always be desirable of her to do so. Moreover, it has shown that 
denying „low type‟ individuals the opportunity to copy a product they would otherwise not 
buy lowers the consumer surplus. We have looked at the traditional anti-piracy measures of 
copy controls and tax on complementary goods, and the effects these might have on piracy 
  
  
Figure 9: Effect on distribution curve,   increases 
Source: Croxson (2009) 
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and the consumers‟ susceptibility to copy. We have shown that targeted enforcement, in the 
sense that enforcement discriminated between „high value‟ and „low value‟ consumers, was a 
preferred option to broad based enforcement, as it helped bring prices down from a super-
monopoly level to standard monopoly pricing. Lastly, we saw that the publisher can rid her 
market of piracy, if her market is characterized by a negative     relationship, if the fixed cost 
component of piracy costs is set to equal the monopoly price. 
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9 Conclusions 
In this thesis I have looked at potential effects arising from illegal copying. The focus 
has been on downloading of music files, due to its popularity in the media and to have a fixed 
idea of the concept. The general idea is applicable for other industries however, especially 
within the digital media industry. Though these sectors only make up a small part of the 
global economy, they make up for a huge part of people‟s lives. 
The recording industry is losing money by the minute, and intense battles are being 
fought both in the courts of law and within political decision making in order to stem illegal 
file-sharing, or „piracy‟ as it is usually referred to. We have seen that a vast array of literature 
has been dedicated to this subject, and that conclusions and opinions have varied as 
technological progress has made copies better and easier to make.  We have also seen that 
economists differ in opinion as to the effects of file-sharing on the recording industry and on 
the economy today. 
The general idea put forth in this thesis is that illegal downloading might not be as bad 
as portrayed by the industry and its lobbyists. In some cases, we have seen that it might 
actually have positive effects on record sales. This hinges on assumptions regarding the 
distribution of individuals who are buying records. Most studies argue that teenagers and 
young adults make up the consumer group of records. I have argued that this might be a 
simplification of reality but used this assumption myself when needed for my analysis. I have 
also showed that policy instruments like taxes on copying complementarities, subsidies, and 
fines might alter the distribution of consumers. I concluded that from a social point of view, it 
is more desirable to implement subsidies, as this will lower the price facing the consumer. 
Fines will not help increase the legal sales, as those who are deterred from piracy by the 
potential penalty will usually not be in the market for purchasing the product anyway. Thus, it 
will have a negative effect on consumer surplus without compensating the publisher. Taxes 
will reach too wide as they also deter some of the potentially legal uses of the copying 
complementarities. 
I have also discussed the difficulties in copy protection and copyright enforcement. As 
publishers seek to retain their business model, they have relied on intensive use of copy 
protection, as well as appealing to law enforcement agencies that pirates are violating 
copyright laws. Proponents of the existing laws and the industry argue that these copyright 
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violations hinder further innovation and harms music. I have shown that, contrary to its intent, 
the copyright might actually be bad for innovation, as it provides the copyright holder a 
cushion to rest on. The introduction of pirates has forced the industry to innovate in order to 
stay in business. Interestingly, it has been outside-agents like iTunes and Spotify who have 
made the most profitable musical innovations this past decade, and those innovations have 
probably done more in the battle against piracy than the legal actions undertaken on behalf of 
the record industry. 
The most important finding in my opinion is that, contrary to industry claims, piracy is 
not killing music. Rather, it is the recording industry as we know it that is in trouble. The past 
decade has seen a dramatic shift in popular attitudes towards the music industry, and to how 
we treat music as a consumer good. The Internet has offered a whole new distribution channel 
and made it possible for previously obscure and unsigned artists to build a fan base without 
the involvement of a record label. In addition, by the widespread broadband access in the 
Western world, it has rendered the physical container music usually has been sold in useless. 
Now, music is being downloaded directly into our computers and portable music players, and 
the packaging has been substituted with a digital file consisting of a sequence of 0s and 1s. As 
a result, we no longer put the same monetary value on recorded music. On the other hand, our 
demand and our willingness to pay for a live performance have increased. Artists thus spend 
more time touring than before, and the consequently also spend less time recording. This 
might be bad news for the recording industry, but can be good news for music lovers. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Table A1: Time Between Album Releases 
Year of Album Release Average # Years Since Previous Album 
1995 1.163 
1996 1.318 
1997 1.460 
1998 1.623 
1999 1.647 
2000 1.637 
2001 1.702 
2002 1.757 
2003 1.755 
2004 1.832 
Source: Mortimer and Sorensen (2005), table 7 
Table A2: Probability of Touring 
 1993-1998 1999-2002 Relative % Change 
Genre    
Country/Folk 3.04 3.02 -0.7 
Jazz/Latin 1.04 1.42 36.5 
Rock/Metal 4.13 3.88 -6.1 
Urban/Rap 1.31 2.11 61.1 
Age of Band/Artist    
<5 years 2.64 3.28 24.2 
6-10 years 3.51 3.57 1.7 
11-20 years 3.57 3.12 -12.6 
21+ years 2.96 2.98 0.7 
Overall 3.20 3.33 4.1 
Source: Mortimer and Sorensen (2005), table 5 
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Table A3: Concert Revenue* 
 Tickets Sold Concerts Held Ticket Price, 
avg. 
Revenue % Change 
in Revenue 
1993 10.0 2956 18.87 189  
1994 12.1 3890 21.40 258 36.5 
1995 13.8 4588 20.66 285 10.5 
1996 12.8 4803 21.22 272 -4.6 
1997 14.3 5170 26.21 375 37.9 
1998 16.0 4610 26.36 422 12.5 
1999 16.0 4846 31.34 501 18.7 
2000 14.6 4788 33.66 490 -2.2 
2001 16.0 6537 37.56 601 22.7 
2002 17.4 7609 35.77 622 3.5 
*Tickets and revenue divided by 1,000,000. Revenue and ticket price in US December 1997 
dollars. % change author’s calculations. “The Napster Years” in bold. Source: Mortimer and 
Sorensen (2005), table 1. 
Table A4: New Artists Releasing Records* 
 Country/Folk Jazz/Latin Rock Urban/Rap Total 
1995 642 1,982 1,359 902 4,855 
1996 621 1,537 1,422 1,006 4,586 
1997 565 1,315 1,301 1,056 4,237 
1998 596 1,217 1,395 1,177 4,385 
1999 644 1,453 1,984 1,493 5,574 
2000 1,563 1,894 3,257 1,983 8,697 
2001 924 1,331 2,667 1,758 6,680 
2002 785 1,252 2,519 1,477 6,033 
2003 676 1,337 2,316 1,174 5,503 
2004 904 1,627 1,919 1,297 5,747 
*”The Napster Years” in bold. Source: Mortimer and Sorensen (2005), table 6. 
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Appendix B 
Why      
The argument hinges on a negative correlation between   and  . This must mean that 
the person with the highest valuation of the product has the lowest cost of piracy. Lets denote 
these values   and  , respectively. If     , then the individual with the lowest cost of 
piracy will not be tempted to copy at the monopoly price. Since no one has a lower cost, no 
one will be copying in this market. The possibility of piracy will have no impact on the 
publisher‟s profit. 
 The picture changes if     . This condition implies that the individual with the 
highest valuation of the product would rather copy it than purchase it legally. Piracy is thus 
damaging to the publisher‟s profit. These are the individuals the publisher wants to rid the 
market off. By increasing the fixed cost of piracy, every individual‟s cost of piracy increases 
by the same amount (illustrated by the parallel shift of the curve). The individual with the 
lowest cost to piracy will therefore be the one who has the lowest    value. The lowest value 
this will have for an individual will be zero. Then it is easy to see that the lowest value of   
that will rid this market of piracy, is if       . 
              
 
